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CAFA'S IMPACT ON FORUM SHOPPING AND
THE MANIPULATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA")
in response to perceived problems with, and abuses of, the traditional class
action system.' Proponents of CAFA accused class action lawyers of
abusing the device to benefit their own interests, rather than the interests of
individual class members. 2 This abuse also extended to state and local
courts that kept cases of national importance out of federal court, displayed
bias against out-of-state defendants, and made binding judgments that
imposed on the rights of out-of-state residents.3
Recognizing that
procedural safeguards were necessary to remedy this abuse and to ensure
that class actions operate as a "valuable tool in our jurisprudential system,"
Congress implemented CAFA.4
1

See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4-5 (codified in

scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (declaring CAFA's purpose). Class actions were designed to be a
"valuable tool in our jurisprudential system" by providing a means for similarly-harmed plaintiffs
to seek redress from a common defendant when the harm to each individual plaintiff would not be
substantial enough to justify the cost of litigation. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 3 (2005), reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5 (noting benefits of class actions). The Senate report cautions that the
class action device is only a valuable jurisprudential tool so long as the interests of class members
remain a priority. Id.; see also Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005: The Story
Behind the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 97-98 (2009) (describing Congress's acknowledgement of
class action litigation abuse). Congress enacted CAFA to respond to the perception that attorneys
abused the class action device by forum shopping and manipulating the civil justice system.
Ellis, supra, at 98.
2 See Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a) (listing Congress's perception of class action abuse).
Congress notes that class members often receive little benefit from the suit and may even be
harmed in cases where counsel receive excessive fees, or where unjustified awards are given to
certain class members at the expense of others. Id.; see also Ellis, supra note 1, at 98 (noting
plaintiffs' attorneys often awarded substantial fee outweighing each class member's individual
interest in litigation); Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on ClassAction Lawyers, 156 U. PA.
L. REv. 1593, 1596-97 (2008) ("CAFA's proponents successfully portrayed class action lawyers
as opportunistic aggregators who get rich on litigation of their own making .... ").
3 See Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(4) ("Abuses in class actions undermine the national
judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as
intended by the framers of the United States Constitution .... ); see also S. REP. No. 109-14, at
22-23, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22-23 (admonishing state court judges for careless class
certification and for approving excessive settlement judgments). The Senate Judiciary Committee
argued that inadequate supervision of class certification and settlement negotiations in state courts
enabled many plaintiffs' attorneys to "'game' the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multistate class actions in state courts." S. REP. No. 109-14, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5.
4 See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 3, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6 ("[CAFA] is a modest,
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CAFA's purpose is to assure prompt recovery for class members
with legitimate claims by expanding the scope of federal diversity
jurisdiction over interstate cases of national importance.5 CAFA expands
original jurisdiction of the federal courts to class action suits where (1) the

amount in controversy exceeds $5 million; (2) the class is made up of over6

100 members; and (3) any one plaintiff is diverse from any one defendant.
Additionally, CAFA makes federal courts more accessible7 to a removing
defendant by relaxing the traditional removal requirements.
While these procedural changes have addressed many of the abuses
Congress sought to correct, CAFA's provisions have created new
interpretation issues for the courts and a new form of abuse by attorneys. 8
For example, although there is evidence that CAFA has successfully shifted
many class action disputes from state to federal courts, CAFA does not
address the underlying problems that created abuse of the class action
device in the first place: forum shopping and manipulation of the civil
justice system. 9 Exacerbating the issue, the circuit courts are split
regarding what burden a removing party must meet to demonstrate that the
balanced step that would address some of the most egregious problems in class action practice.").
But see Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the ClassAction FairnessAct on
the Federal Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1723,

1725 (2008) ("Opponents of [CAFA] generally defended the status quo as supporting the rights of
states to enforce their own laws."). Many CAFA opponents worried that expanding federal
jurisdiction over diversity class actions, which are almost always based on state law
interpretation, would infringe on state sovereignty rights. Id.Additionally, opponents of CAFA
"expressed alarm at the potential addition of thousands of cases to the federal courts' dockets."
Id.
5

See Class Action Fairness Act § 2(b) (defining purpose of legislation); see also Stephen J.

Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005: In
Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 77, 81 (2007) (addressing

nationwide ramifications resulting from class actions involving more people and money than
other lawsuits).
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5) (2006) (listing requirements for federal jurisdiction
under CAFA).
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2006) (allowing class action removal without regard to
citizenship and consent of all defendants).
8 See Erichson supra note 2, at 1606-07 (predicting stronger class action bar unintended
consequence of CAFA's procedural changes). In addition to creating statutory interpretation
questions for the courts, CAFA has altered the litigation landscape by requiring plaintiffs'
attorneys to adapt their forum-selection and claim-selection strategies. Id.at 1614. Rather than
seek the most favorable state courts, plaintiffs' attorneys are increasingly filing originally in
federal court so that they can select the most favorable federal forum. Id. While this
accomplishes CAFA's goal of shifting multi-state class action lawsuits from state to federal
courts, it undermines CAFA's goal of preventing forum shopping and abuse of the class action
device. Id.at 1626.
9 See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (explaining results of Federal Judicial
Center's CAFA research).

2012]

THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT

amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 10 This circuit split creates an
incentive for attorneys seeking to avoid federal jurisdiction to further abuse
the civil justice system.11
This Note proposes that although CAFA may have successfully
shifted many nationwide class actions to federal courts, it has not remedied
the underlying abuses that first prompted class action reform. 12 Part I
outlines CAFA's history and implementation. 3 Part II discusses CAFA's
docket shift from state to federal courts and the challenges each circuit has
faced with interpreting the burden a removing defendant must meet to
invoke CAFA jurisdiction. 4 Finally, Part III analyzes the implications of
CAFA's docket shift, as well as the circuit split, on forum shopping and the
manipulation of the civil justice system. 15
I. HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
A. Class Actions in Need of Reform
Class actions have been utilized for over 150 years to adjudicate
disputes involving numerous parties. 6 For plaintiffs, class actions provide
10 See infra note 64 and accompanying text (listing each circuit's removal burden
requirement); see also Dwight J. Davis, Jonathan R. Chally & Zachary A. McEntyre, Frederico v.
Home Depot: The Third Circuit Clarifies the Removal Burden for CAFA Defendants, but Is the
Burden Still Too High?, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 358, 359 (2008) (describing standards of proof
utilized by courts of appeals).
11 See infra Part III (analyzing circuit split's effect on class action attorneys).
12 See infra Part III (analyzing CAFA's effects on forum shopping and manipulation of civil
justice system).
13 See infra Part I (discussing factors leading to CAFA's implementation).
14 See infra Part II (detailing CAFA's aftermath).
15 See infra Part III (analyzing CAFA's effects).
16 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7 ("Although class
actions have some roots in common law, the general concept was first codified in 1849, when
several states adopted the Field Code."). The Field Code required litigants to demonstrate a
common interest in law or fact before a dispute could be prosecuted as a class action. Id. In
1938, Congress adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to govern class action disputes. Id.
Subsequently, the modern form of class actions took shape in 1966, when Congress substantially
amended Rule 23 to expand the availability of the class action device. See id.(citing expansion
of class action availability as factor motivating 1966 amendments); 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (7th ed. 2010) (outlining purpose of Rule 23
amendments). Specifically, the 1966 amendments ensured the preclusive effect of class action
judgments by binding all those "whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether or not
the judgment is favorable to the class." See MCLAUGHLIN, supra, § 1:1 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
23 advisory committee note); see also White v. Deltona Corp., 66 F.R.D. 560, 563 (S.D. Fla.
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a mechanism for seeking redress against a common defendant when the
interest of each individual plaintiff is not substantial enough to justify the
cost of litigation. 17 For defendants, class actions avoid inconsistent results
and promote efficiency by allowing the adjudication or settlement of all
potential claims at one time. 18 For courts, class actions promote the
economical administration of justice by avoiding multiple suits involving
the same claims. 19 Finally, for consumers, class actions promote corporate

1975) ("[T]he 1966 revision of Rule 23 was meant to . ..lessen problems relating to the res
judicata effect of judgments."). In its original form, Rule 23 did not provide guidance as to what
set of circumstances would justify class-wide preclusion. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra, § 1:1.
Additionally, preclusion under the original rule was complicated by "spurious class actions,"
which bound only those members who participated directly in the litigation. Id.By eliminating
"spurious class actions" and mandating that judgments bind all class members, the 1966
amendments promoted judicial efficiency. Id.; see also The Class Action FairnessAct of 1999:
Hearings on S. 353 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate
Comm. of the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 55-94 (1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. John

P. Frank, S. Comm. on Civil Rules) (explaining historical context behind adoption of 1966
Amendment to Rule 23). As a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in 1966, John
P. Frank noted, that "[i]f there was a single, undoubted goal of the committee, the energizing
force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class action
system which could deal with civil rights, and, explicitly, segregation." Hearings,supra, at 60.
At the time Rule 23 was amended, the Advisory Committee had not anticipated the dramatic
increase in litigation that would occur in the following twenty to thirty years. See id.
(describing
state of litigation in 1966). Consequently, as the country became more litigious in the late 1980s,
the utilization of Rule 23 expanded beyond civil rights class action disputes to include personal
injury, products liability, and other mass tort actions. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The
Dilemma of the Mass Tort ClassAction, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1357-58 (1995) (outlining

shift in circuits toward allowing class action certification for mass tort disputes). Plaintiffs'
attorneys successfully argued to judges that Rule 23 should be interpreted broadly to allow class
certification of mass tort cases, so that individual tort cases would not overly burden the judicial
system. Id. at 1358. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and
Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 687, 694-96 (1997) (tracing history

of class actions).
17 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(i), 119 Stat. 4, 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) ("[Class actions] permit the fair and efficient
resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be aggregated into a
single action against a defendant that has allegedly caused harm."); Stephen B. Burbank, The
ClassAction FairnessAct of2005 in HistoricalContext: A PreliminaryView, 156 U. PA. L. REV.

1439, 1487 (2008) (stating class actions allow "economically irrational" individual claims against
common adversary). But see Ellis, supra note 1, at 76 (criticizing class actions where interest of
no single plaintiff is enough to justify litigation).
18 See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 16, § 1:3 ("[D]efendants can... consensually resolve on a
global basis all claims arising out of an event or transaction that otherwise could mire a company
or an industry in decades of litigation with myriad adversaries."). Additionally, class action
settlements can "extinguish the claims of actual and potential claimants both in the settled lawsuit
and, in appropriate circumstances, in other lawsuits in different jurisdictions." Id.
19 See id. § 1:1 (stating class actions promote "efficiency and fairness in handling large
numbers of similar claims" (quoting W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v.Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 62 (W.
Va. 2003))). Specifically, class actions promote efficiency and fairness by consolidating the
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accountability and fairness in the marketplace .20
Despite these benefits, class actions have been heavily criticized. 2'
In the pre-CAFA context, critics cited lax class certification by state court
judges as leading to abuse of the class action device. 22 Specifically, critics
were concerned that lax certification encouraged attorneys to abuse the
civil justice system by "forum shopping" for pro-plaintiff state court
jurisdictions, and by manipulating pleadings to avoid federal jurisdiction
altogether.23
1. Lax Certification and the Magnet Jurisdiction Problem
Under Rule 23, a class action may be brought so long as the
following conditions are met:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly

"time, effort and expense" that would be necessary to litigate each claim individually. Id.
Furthermore, class actions promote fairness by ensuring "uniformity of decisions" in similar
claims. Id.
20 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 78 (stating class action redress necessary to prevent
corporations from wrongfully profiting from harming consumers). Class actions add value to
society because they benefit consumers by keeping corporations and businesses accountable for
actions affecting commerce. Id. at 79. Additionally, the class action device is necessary in the
products liability and mass tort context because plaintiffs might not have any other practical
option for redress if they could not band together when harmed by a business or corporation. Id.
21 See Erichson, supra note 2, at 1593-94 (describing class action lawyers as "self-interested,
unscrupulous, unprincipled, and unaccountable" (footnote call numbers omitted)).
CAFA
proponents successfully depicted class action attorneys as "opportunistic aggregators who get rich
on litigation of their own making." Id. at 1596; see also Ellis, supra note 1, at 76 (addressing
class action criticism). By allowing lawsuits to be brought where the interest of no single
plaintiff would justify the costs of litigation, class actions contribute to the "skyrocketing number
of lawsuits" filed each year. Ellis, supra note 1, at 76.
22 See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide
Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 488 (2000) (describing litigation explosion following availability of
mass tort class actions); Jeffrey L. Roether, Note, Interpreting CongressionalSilence: CAFA 's
JurisdictionalBurden of Proofin Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2745, 2751 (2007) ("[D]uring the period of 1988 to 1998, class action filings against Fortune 500
companies increased by more than 300% in federal courts and by more than 1000% in state
courts.").
23 See Roether, supra note 22, at 2751 (describing class action device as "efficient tool of
entrepreneurial" plaintiffs' attorneys); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 7-9 (2005), reprinted in
2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 8-10 (summarizing then-current rules governing federal jurisdiction).
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and adequately protect the interests of the class.24
Congress imposed these requirements to promote efficient
administration of justice and to safeguard the due process rights of absent
class members and defendants.25
However, during the litigation explosion of the 1990s, state court
judges of certain jurisdictions, known as magnet jurisdictions, developed a
reputation for being less careful than their federal counterparts about
applying Rule 23's requirements to potential classes of plaintiffs. 26 Absent
24

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 6, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

7 (describing Rule 23 requirements). In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), a
prospective class must meet certain requirements that depend on the type of class proposed. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). For example, under Rule 23(b)(3), a damages class will only be certified if
the proponent shows that "the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Id.at 23(b)(3).
25 See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4-5, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7-8 (discussing purpose
of Rule 23). The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that all class members are similarly
situated in order to protect the rights of unnamed class members. Id. Furthermore, Rule 23
protects the due process rights of both the unnamed class members and defendants. Id. Rule 23's
procedural requirements are necessary so that a court can ensure, "to the greatest extent possible,"
that it is fair to bind the interests of every member of the class. See generally In re Gen. Motors
Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783-86 (3d Cir. 1995)
(discussing fundamental principles behind Rule 23's requirements). Rule 23's numerosity
requirement is designed to prevent members of small classes from being unnecessarily deprived
of their rights, without being heard in court, because all members of a class action are bound by
the judgment. See Rippey v. Denver U.S. Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704, 713 (D. Colo. 1966)
(finding eight class members too few to satisfy Rule 23's numerosity requirement). The
numerosity requirement is typically satisfied when the number of class members exceeds forty.
See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
"numerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members" (citing 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 2d
§ 3.05 (1985 ed.))); Krieger v. Gast, 197 F.R.D. 310, 314 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (stating class of
forty or more members is generally sufficient to meet numerosity requirement). Additionally,
Rule 23 safeguards the rights of absent class members by requiring that there be questions of law
or fact common to the class, without requiring that every question of law and fact be common to
every member of the class. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 514 (W.D. Pa. 1971)
("Nothing in F.R.C.P. 23 ...mandates that the identity of the questions of fact or law be total.").
The typicality requirement of Rule 23 ensures that no significant aspect of any class member's
claim will go unrepresented by the named plaintiffs. See Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581, 587 (E. D. Pa. 1975) (declaring similar claims required to ensure
absent class members adequately represented). Named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class if
they arise "from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of
other class members, and if [they] are based on the same legal theory." Abby v. City of Detroit,
218 F.R.D. 544, 547 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (quoting In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082
(6th Cir. 1996)). Finally, Rule 23 requires adequacy of representation because of the binding
effect that a judgment in a class action has upon those who are defined to be a member of the
class. See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 67 F.R.D. 98, 102 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (stating
adequacy of representation should not be "lightly regarded").
26 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13-14, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14 (citing state
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consistent class certification by state judges, attorneys had an incentive to
file similar lawsuits in several jurisdictions in order to find a judge willing
to certify the class.27 Critics of the class action device opposed this practice
as increasing judicial inefficiencies
and contravening the Supreme Court's
28
anti-forum shopping policy.
Additionally, critics cited magnet jurisdictions as leading to
frivolous lawsuits that violated the due process rights of defendants. 29 For
court's failure to follow Rule 23's strict requirements or state's parallel governing rule). The
Senate Judiciary Committee noted that federal courts pay closer attention to the procedural
requirements of Rule 23 than their state court counterparts because state courts often lack the
resources necessary to supervise class action disputes. Id.at 13, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 14-15. In contrast, federal judges have the support of law clerks and can appoint special
masters when they are faced with complex litigation. Id. Not surprisingly, abuses by class
counsel were more likely to occur when state court judges were unable to give complex class
action disputes the attention they required. See id. (criticizing lax certification as incentivizing
attorneys to seek out magnet jurisdictions). For example, between 1998 and 2002, the Circuit
Court of Madison County, Illinois, a small rural county, home to less than one percent of the
United States population, attracted more class actions each year than some of the nation's most
populous communities. See JOHN H. BEISNER & JESSICA DAVIDSON MILLER, CTR.FOR LEGAL
POLICY, CLASS ACTION MAGNET COURTS: THE ALLURE INTENSIFIES 1 (2002), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr 05.pdf (describing class action magnet jurisdictions).
Between the years of 1998 and 2000, the number of class action filings in Madison County rose
from two to thirty-nine, resulting in a 1850 percent increase in class action filings in that
jurisdiction. Id.If class actions were filed nationwide at that rate, there would be nearly 43,000
class actions filed throughout the United States each year. Id.More troubling, nearly all of the
Madison County Class actions involved non-Madison County defendants. Id.at 1-2. Finally,
during the years 1998 2000, the Madison County class action docket was monopolized by a
"small cadre of plaintiffs' counsel." Id.at 2. But see Lee & Willging, supra note 4, at 1725
(explaining CAFA has potential to overburden federal judiciary). Critics of CAFA worried that
the mass docket shift to federal court would overburden the federal judiciary by consuming scarce
judicial resources. See id.
27 See S. REP.NO. 109-14, at 23, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 23 (describing tactics
used by class action plaintiffs' counsel). Exacerbating this problem, there is no way to
consolidate overlapping class actions filed in different state court jurisdictions, which means that
each action must be litigated separately in an "uncoordinated, redundant fashion." Id. This
results in an enormous waste of judicial resources because "multiple judges of different courts
must spend considerable time adjudicating precisely the same claims asserted on behalf of
precisely the same people." Id. However, when overlapping cases are pending in different
federal courts, "they can be consolidated under one single judge to promote judicial efficiency
and ensure consistent treatment of the legal issues involved." Id.
28

See generally Justin D. Forlenza, Note, CAFA and Erie: UnconstitutionalConsequences?,

75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1065, 1091-95 (2006) (analyzing CAFA's implications on Supreme
Court's anti-forum shopping policy). Concerned with vertical forum shopping, the Supreme
Court held in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
state substantive law. See 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (announcing holding of court). CAFA critics
worry that federal courts sitting in diversity will be forced to create federal substantive law with
regard to class action suits. See Forlenza, supra, at 1094 ("[T]he same problem that prompted
Congress to enact CAFA horizontal forum shopping could arise in the federal court system.").
29 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 20-21, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21 (criticizing
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example, in the pre-CAFA context, attorneys were more likely to file weak
lawsuits in magnet jurisdictions because once a lawsuit was certified as a
class action, it was more likely to be settled. 0 Due to the expense and
negative publicity associated with defending against a class action lawsuit,
many defendants chose to settle class actions in the early stages of
litigation.3 1 When these same lawsuits were based on frivolous claims, the
due process rights of the defendant were violated.32
2. Diversity Jurisdiction Manipulation
Critics also claimed that class action attorneys "gamed the system"
by manipulating the requirements of diversity jurisdiction to avoid federal
court.33 Under 28 U.S.C. §1332, a dispute may be heard in federal court if
the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds
the
4
statutorily-required threshold, which is currently set at $75,000.
Before enactment of CAFA, the "complete diversity rule"
mandated that all named class action plaintiffs be from different states of

frivolous lawsuits filed in state court as "judicial blackmail"). Prior to the enactment of CAFA,
class attorneys often exercised "unbounded leverage" against corporate defendants in magnet
jurisdictions. Id.
30 See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE
SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 11 (2008), available at

Two's PRE-CAFA

ftp://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/cafaI 108.pdf ("Every case in which a motion to certify was

granted, unconditionally or for settlement purposes, resulted in a class settlement.").
31 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 103 (outlining risks associated with defending class action
disputes). Additionally, critics of the class action device admonish attorneys for using huge,
unmanageable class actions to "blackmail" defendants "who could not risk the possible ruin of a
jury verdict" into settling the dispute. Id. Too often, settlements benefit class counsel more than
class members. Id.
32

See generally S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 16, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21 ("[Class

action] leverage can essentially force corporate defendants to pay ransom to class attorneys by
settling

rather than litigating

frivolous lawsuits.").
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11-12 (explaining

33 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 10-11,

methods used by plaintiffs' attorneys to "game the system" to evade federal jurisdiction).
34 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Section 1332(a) provides, in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in
section 1603 (a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
§ 1332(a)(1)-(4).
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all named defendants.35 Additionally, 28 U.S.C. §1441(b) prohibited
removal of a class action from state court if any defendant was a citizen of
the state in which the action was filed.36 Thus, by purposefully adding a
non-diverse party, or by filing the action in the defendant's state of
citizenship, class action attorneys manipulated diversity jurisdiction to
evade federal court.37
Attorneys also avoided federal jurisdiction by manipulating the
amount in controversy requirements. 38 The Supreme Court has held that
where one plaintiff meets the requisite amount in controversy, other
plaintiffs with the same or substantially similar claims against a common
defendant will not defeat diversity jurisdiction, even if those plaintiffs'
claims are for less than $75,000. 3 9 However, by claiming that no one
plaintiff's damages meet the statutorily required amount, class action
attorneys "misused"
the jurisdictional threshold to avoid federal
40
jurisdiction.

B. The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005
These criticisms led Congress to pass CAFA, a procedural statute
intended to rectify past abuse by amending diversity jurisdiction and
removal requirements for class actions. 4 ' Specifically, CAFA amended the
35 See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (holding only named
parties are considered for federal diversity jurisdiction); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267
(1806) (holding no diversity jurisdiction where any plaintiff is from same state as any defendant).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
31 See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 7,reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11 (summarizing federal
forum evasion tactic). One witness at the Committee's 2002 hearing on class actions testified that
her business was a named defendant in "hundreds of lawsuits" for the purpose of ensuring that the
cases were heard "in a place known for its lawsuit-friendly environment." Id.
38 See id.
at 10, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11-12 ("Cilass action lawyers typically
misuse[d] the jurisdictional threshold to keep their cases out of federal court."). For example,
class action lawyers often claimed that no class member sought the jurisdictional amount required
for federal jurisdiction. Id.at 11, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 12. However, after removal,
attorneys would amend the complaint to seek more relief. Id.
39 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005) (holding
§ 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff claims failing to meet the requisite
amount in controversy).
40 See S. REP.No. 109-14, at 8, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 12 ("For example, class
action complaints often include a provision stating that no class member will seek more than
$75,000 in relief, even though they can simply amend their complaints after the removal to seek
more relief and even though the class action seeks millions of dollars in the aggregate.").
41 See id.
at 27, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27 (describing CAFA as "modest attempt"
to address problems and abuses in class action system). By amending diversity jurisdiction and
removal requirements, Congress sought to enable federal courts to hear more class actions. Id.
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diversity jurisdiction requirements under 28 U.S.C. §1332 to give federal
courts original jurisdiction over class actions where the aggregate amount
in controversy involves at least $5 million; where there are over 100
members of the class; and where any one plaintiff is diverse from any one
defendant. 42 By relaxing the diversity jurisdiction requirements, Congress
intended for CAFA to ensure that federal judges decide class actions of
nationwide importance by making it easier for class actions to be filed in,
or removed to, federal court.43

Additionally, CAFA amended the 28 U.S.C. §1453 requirements
that a defendant must meet to remove a case to federal court in the class
action context. 44 Under CAFA, a class action may be removed to federal
court regardless of whether a defendant is a citizen of the state in which the
action was filed. 45 Furthermore, defendants no longer need the consent of
all co-defendants before seeking removal to a federal forum.46
II. AFTERMATH OF CAFA: ITS IMPACT ON FORUM-SELECTION
AND MANIPULATION OF PLEADINGS
In the years following CAFA's enactment, preliminary data from
the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") suggests that CAFA has successfully
shifted many nationwide class action lawsuits from state to federal courts.47

42

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).

41 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7 (declaring CAFA's

purpose). The Senate Judiciary Committee determined that federal courts are the proper forums
to decide most class action lawsuits having significant implications for interstate commerce,
because the then-current diversity and removal standards facilitated a "parade of abuses" in the
state courts. Id.
44 Class Action Fairness Act § 5(a).
45 See id ("A class action may be removed ... without regard to whether any defendant is a
citizen of the State in which the action is brought ....
").This provision sought to eliminate the
common practice of manipulating the parties to defeat federal jurisdiction. See Erichson, supra
note 2, at 1598 ("By replacing the complete diversity requirement with minimal diversity, by
eliminating the in-state defendant exception and the unanimity requirement for removal, and by
allowing aggregation of the amount in controversy, CAFA ensured that nearly all large-scale
class actions could be filed in or removed to federal court.").
46 See Class Action Fairness Act § 5(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006) ("[S]uch action may be
removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants."). This provision furthered
Congress's goal of making removal more readily available to class action defendants. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text (stating purpose of enacting CAFA).
47 See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGNG, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1 (2008) [hereinafter FJC
STUDY],
available
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rulesandpolicies/rules/fourth/

20interim/ 20report

0
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oclass
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However, the data indicates that although every circuit saw an increase in
class actions originally filed in, and removed to, federal court, those
increases varied dramatically.4 8 Specifically, circuits considered relatively
liberal on class certification, such as the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals, saw dramatic increases compared to the level of
increases reported in more conservative circuits, such as the Fourth, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.49
As expected, the number of removals to federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction increased after CAFA's enactment.50 Specifically, the
First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits saw
increases, with diversity removals increasing by more than one hundred
percent in the First, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits."i Notably, the Seventh

20action.pdf (finding seventy two percent overall increase in class action activity in the eightyeight district courts studied). After Congress passed CAFA, the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Federal Rights requested that the FJC study CAFA's impact on federal court
procedures and workloads. Id. The FJC studied class action filings and removals in the federal
courts from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2007. Id. Specifically, the FJC compared statistics
from July through December 2001 (pre-CAFA) with January through June 2007 (post-CAFA) to
draw conclusions about whether CAFA had successfully shifted class actions to federal courts.
Id. In the pre-CAFA period, 1370 class actions were filed in, or removed to, federal court,
compared with 2354 in the post-CAFA study period. Id. at 3. Notably, the federal courts
observed the single largest number of filings and removals in March 2005, immediately following
the enactment of CAFA. See Lee & Willging, supra note 4, at 1750 (interpreting FJC study's
findings). The FJC concluded that its findings were "consistent with the hypothesis that CAFA
has caused an increased number of class actions based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to
be filed in the federal courts." See FJC STUDY, supra, at 1.
48 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 1-2 (summarizing FJC findings); see also Erichson,
supra note 2, at 1613 (detailing FJC's findings).
49 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 22 (illustrating substantial increases in original filings
and removals in Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits); see also Erichson, supra note 2, at 1612
(citing John C. Coffee Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over the Last
Five Years 2002-2007, 8 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) S-819 (Oct. 26, 2007)
(characterizing each circuit's class certification policy)). Although the law on class certification
varies between each circuit, certain circuits have a reputation for being relatively liberal on class
certification namely, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits. See Erichson, supra note 2, at
1612. Conversely, the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits are known as being relatively
conservative about class certification. Id.
50 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 6 (reporting class action removal statistics). In the preCAFA period studied, diversity class action removals averaged 17.2% per month. Id. That figure
increased to 33.3% per month from March 2005 through June 2006. Id.
51 See id. at 8, 22 (analyzing diversity class action removal by circuit). By analyzing each
circuit's data separately, the FJC found that although removals decreased in a few circuits, most
of the districts with substantial numbers of diversity class actions experienced increases in
diversity removals. Id. at 8. The circuits experiencing decreases in removals were the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 22. In the district courts of the Ninth Circuit, the
number of cases removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction substantially
increased from sixty-two cases in 2002 2003, to 130 cases in the last two years of the study
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Circuit, which contained one of the most notorious magnet jurisdictions in
the pre-CAFA context, experienced more than a doubling of class action
removals when comparing the twelve-month period before and after
CAFA's effective date 52 However, overall diversity class action removals
trended downward in the last two months of the study, leveling off near the
pre-CAFA number of removals per month.53 The FJC cautioned that
without comparable data on class action activity in the state courts, it could
not make any definitive conclusions regarding the reason for the decrease
in class action removals.5 4
Interestingly, original filings in federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction also increased dramatically after the enactment of CAFA. 55 In

period. Id.at 8.
52

See Lee & Willging, supra note 4, at 1762 (announcing removal data as it relates to

Seventh Circuit). The FJC researchers posited that defendants in the Seventh Circuit took
advantage of CAFA's relaxed procedural requirements to remove their cases to federal court. Id.
In the pre-CAFA context, the state courts of the Seventh Circuit were considered magnet
jurisdictions. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing Circuit Court of Madison
County, Illinois as magnet jurisdiction).
53 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 6. In the last twelve months of the study, July 2006
through June 2007, diversity class action removals decreased to an average of 18.1 per month, a
figure comparable to the number of removals in the pre-CAFA period. Id.at 6.
54 See id. at 7 (refusing to make definitive conclusion). However, the increase in diversity
jurisdiction class actions being filed originally in federal court suggests that there may be fewer
class actions in state court to remove. Id.at 8; see also Lee & Willging, supra note 4, at 1748
(noting no conclusive findings may be made without comparable state court data).
55 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 8 ("[T]he number of diversity class actions filed as
original proceedings in the district courts basically tripled, increasing by slightly more than 200
percent."). The FJC found an overall increase in diversity class actions originally filed in federal
district court in eleven of the twelve circuits. Id.at 9. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
had the greatest increases in original filings. Id. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits saw major decreases in removals as compared to the increases each circuit saw in
diversity class action suits originally filed in federal court. Id. Additionally, the FJC noted a
dramatic increase in original diversity class action filings in certain district courts within each
circuit. Id.at 10 (analyzing diversity class action removal by district within each circuit). For
example, there was an eleven-fold increase in the Eastern District of Louisiana; more than a
seven-fold increase in both the District of New Jersey and Southern District of Florida; more than
a five-fold increase in the Central District of California; and more than a fourfold increase in the
Northern District of Ohio. Id.This data suggests that while CAFA has enabled defendants to
remove class actions to federal courts, it also has encouraged plaintiffs' attorneys to "file class
actions in those federal courts perceived to be most amenable to class certification." See
Erichson, supra note 2, at 1614; see also FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 7 ("The findings with
respect to increases in diversity class action filings strongly suggest that CAFA has altered class
action plaintiffs' forum choices ....); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 16, § 12:10 ("[E]arly data thus
suggests that many class action plaintiff lawyers have decided to avoid the expense and delay of
removal and remand skirmishes precipitated by state court filings of suits removable under
CAFA."). Since CAFA's enactment, many plaintiffs have chosen to file in the "available federal
district perceived to be most advantageous to their interests." Id.
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particular, diversity class actions originally filed in federal courts during
July through December 2001 (pre-CAFA) averaged 11.9 per month,
compared to an average of 34.5 filed per month during January through
June 2007 (post-CAFA). 6 The Third and Ninth Circuits saw the greatest

overall increases, with the Third Circuit registering a fivefold increase and
the Ninth Circuit registering more than a fourfold increase.57
FJC
researchers cited this dramatic increase as the driving force behind the
overall increase of class action suits being heard in federal court. 58
Although the FJC data suggests that CAFA has successfully
effectuated its purpose of shifting class action disputes of nationwide
importance to federal courts, statutory interpretational issues created by
federal district court judges have created new problems in the class action
context.59
A. InterpretationIssues: Judges
Shortly after CAFA's enactment, the courts were faced with
interpreting which party should bear the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction. 60 Every circuit that has considered this issue has held that the

56

See FJC

STUDY,

supra note 47, at 7 n.6.

57 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 9, 22.
58

See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 12-13 (concluding original filings, rather than removals,

driving post-CAFA increase in federal diversity actions).
59 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (concluding CAFA shifted most class actions
having nationwide importance from state to federal courts); see also infra note 64 and
accompanying text (explaining differences in federal interpretation of CAFA led to circuit split).
See generally Michael D. Y. Sukenik & Adam J. Levitt, CAFA and FederalizedAmbiguity: The
Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class Action, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 234 (2011)
("Millions of dollars in legal fees, along with a great deal of litigants' and judges' time, have been
spent trying to unravel CAFA's statutory framework and its practical meaning.").
60 See Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447-48 (7th Cir. 2005)
(addressing burden issue). In Brill, the Seventh Circuit held that the party seeking federal
jurisdiction has the burden of proving that it is proper under CAFA. Id. at 447. In Brill, the
plaintiff filed a class action in state court alleging that Countrywide Home Loans violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending advertisements by facsimile. Id. In its notice of
removal, pursuant to CAFA, Countrywide alleged that the class was comprised of more than 100
plaintiffs, minimal diversity of citizenship was present, and the amount in controversy exceeded
$5 million. Id. Additionally, Countrywide conceded that it sent at least 3800 advertising faxes.
Id. Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a court may award $500 per fax, which may
be trebled if the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the Act. Id. Thus, the amount in
controversy could reach $5.7 million. Id. Despite this, the district court remanded the case,
ruling that Countrywide did not meet its burden to establish federal jurisdiction. Id. Countrywide
appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting Countrywide's argument that CAFA had
shifted the burden of proof to the party opposing removal. Id. at 447-48. The court reasoned that
placing the burden on the removing party was consistent with the Seventh Circuit's well-
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party seeking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving that it is proper
under CAFA. 6 ' While this broader issue appears settled, there is currently
a split among the circuit courts regarding what burden the removing party
must meet to prove that CAFA jurisdiction is proper.62
The majority of courts have held that when the plaintiff alleges

damages in excess of $5 million, the defendant may remove so long as he
shows by a preponderance of the evidence-or shows a reasonable
probability-that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
minimum. 6' However, the circuits are split regarding what burden a
defendant must prove when the plaintiff disclaims the amount in
controversy.64
The majority of the circuits have adopted the
established precedent under the general removal statute, and that it made practical sense in the
class-action context because the removing party is generally better able to calculate the maximum
amount in controversy. Id. at 447 (citing Smith v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 337 F.3d
888, 892 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599,
607 (7th Cir. 1997)). Additionally, the court noted that when the defendant has access to vital
knowledge that the plaintiff may lack, "a burden that induces the removing party to come forward
with the information-so that the choice between state and federal court may be made
accurately is much to be desired." Id. at 447-48.
61 See, e.g., Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2009)
(holding removing defendant has burden of proving federal jurisdiction under CAFA); Strawn v.
AT & T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[I]n removing a class actionbased on
diversity jurisdiction.., the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must.., demonstrate the
basis for federal jurisdiction."); Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 404-05
(6th Cir. 2007) (stating same); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating same);
DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating same);
Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating same); Abrego
Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding CAFA did not shift
burden of establishing there is no removal jurisdiction); Brill, 427 F.3d at 447-48 (stating same).
62 See cases cited infra note 64 (listing removal burden adopted by each circuit).
63 See Diane B. Bratvold & Daniel J. Supalla, Standard of Proof to Establish Amount in
Controversy when Defending Removal Under the Class Action FairnessAct, 36 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1397, 1413-25 (2010) (explaining majority of circuits have adopted "preponderance of
the evidence test" or functional equivalent). Specifically, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a form of the "preponderance of the
evidence" test to determine whether a removing defendant has proved that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million when the plaintiff claims that the damages are over $5 million.
Id. But see infra note 77 and accompanying text (stating Third and Ninth Circuits use "legal
certainty" test when plaintiff disclaims amount in controversy).
64 See Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2009) (declining to follow legal
certainty test); Smith, 505 F.3d at 407 ("A disclaimer in a complaint regarding the amount of
recoverable damages does not preclude a defendant from removing the matter to federal court
upon a demonstration that damages are 'more likely than not' to 'meet the amount in controversy
requirement' .... "); Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1330 ("[T]he removing defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
requirement."). Likewise, although the standard has yet to be adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, the district courts of that circuit have continued to find that the removing party must
show that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million by a "preponderance of the evidence."
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"preponderance of the evidence" test, with only the Third and Ninth
65
Circuits utilizing the "legal certainty" test.
1. "Preponderance of the Evidence" Test-Majority
Under the "preponderance of the evidence" test, the party asserting
federal jurisdiction has the burden of showing that the amount in
controversy "more likely than not" exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.66
The majority of the circuits have adopted this standard, in one form or
another. 67 In Bell v. Hershey Co. ,68 the Eighth Circuit established a bright-

See, e.g., Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Health Servs. & Educ. Corp., No. 5:10CV67, 2010
WL 4977987, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 2, 2010) ("This Court has consistently applied the
'preponderance of evidence' standard to determine whether a removing defendant has met its
burden of proving the amount in controversy."); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
3:10-0144, 2010 WL 3259418, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 18, 2010) ("Where the complaint does not
specify the amount in controversy, the removing party must prove the jurisdictional amount by a
preponderance of the evidence."); McMahon v. Advance Stores Co., No. 5:07CV123, 2008 WL
183715, at *8 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 18, 2008) (finding defendant's estimates as to amount in
controversy insufficient to meet preponderance of evidence burden). Similarly, the First, Second,
and Seventh Circuits have held that a defendant must show a "reasonable probability" that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. See Amoche, 556 F.3d at 48 (adopting "reasonable
probability" standard); Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
moving party must show "reasonable probability" that jurisdictional threshold met); Brill, 427
F.3d at 449 (acknowledging appropriateness of "reasonable probability" standard). The First
Circuit stated that "for all practical purposes," the "reasonable probability" test is "identical" to
the "preponderance of the evidence" test. See Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50 (stating identical purpose
of "reasonable probability" and "preponderance of evidence" tests). Finally, the Third and Ninth
Circuits utilize both the "legal certainty" test and the "preponderance of the evidence" test
depending on whether the plaintiff specifies an amount in controversy in the complaint. See
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding "preponderance of
evidence" standard applies when plaintiff has not expressly limited damages); Lowdermilk v.
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting "legal certainty" standard
where plaintiff does not specify amount in controversy); Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474 (holding "legal
certainty" standard applies when plaintiff expressly disclaims amount in controversy); Abrego
Abrego, 443 F.3d at 686 (holding "preponderance of evidence" applicable where amount in
controversy not disclaimed).
65 See cases cited supra note 64 (describing tests each circuit utilizes).
66 See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (establishing
"preponderance of evidence" standard); see also Bratvold & Supalla, supra note 63, at 1414
(explaining removing defendant must prove amount in controversy "more likely than not"
exceeds jurisdictional minimum).
67 See cases cited supra note 64 (describing majority and minority views on removal burden).
In Miedema v. Maytag Corp., the Eleventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to hold that the
"preponderance of the evidence" test was the appropriate standard for removal under CAFA. See
450 F.3d at 1332. In Miedema, the plaintiff filed suit in Florida state court on behalf of herself
and all consumers of ovens manufactured by Maytag that contained a defective motorized door
latch. Id. at 1324. The complaint, however, did not specify an amount in controversy. Id. at
1325. Maytag sought removal to federal court under CAFA, claiming that the amount in
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line rule by holding that the "preponderance of the evidence" test is
applicable regardless of whether the plaintiffs expressly allege an amount
in controversy in the complaint.69
The Eighth Circuit based its decision on the burden a removing
party must meet in the non-CAFA context: "[t]he party seeking to remove
'has the burden to prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the
evidence"' regardless of whether the complaint pleads a specific amount in
controversy. 70 The court reasoned that utilizing the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard, rather than the "legal certainty" standard, 7 1 was
necessary to create consistency between CAFA and non-CAFA cases.
Additionally, the court reasoned that requiring a defendant to meet
the high burden of "legal certainty" would conflict with CAFA's primary
purpose of opening "the federal courts to corporate defendants out of
concern that the national economy risked damage from a proliferation of
meritless class action suits. 72 Finally, the Eighth Circuit noted that if the
...

controversy exceeded $5 million because Maytag had sold 6729 ovens in Florida with a total
value of $5,931,971. Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the
case to state court after finding that Maytag failed to demonstrate the amount in controversy by a
"preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 1331. The court announced a two-part "preponderance
of the evidence" test. Id. at 1330. First, the court must determine whether it is "facially apparent
from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement." Id. If
so, that amount controls. Id. However, if the jurisdictional amount is not "facially apparent"
from the complaint, the court must then look to the defendant's notice of removal to determine
whether the jurisdictional amount is met by a "preponderance of the evidence." Id. InMiedema,
Maytag failed to meet its burden because it "offered no explanation as to how [it] arrived at the
conclusion that the 6,729 range/oven units had a 'total value' of $5,931,971 ." Id at 1331.
68 557 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2009).
69 See id. at 958 (announcing holding of case). In Bell, plaintiffs brought a class action in
Iowa state court alleging that five chocolate manufacturers violated state antitrust laws. Id. at
954. In the petition, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and attorneys' fees that were
expressly limited to less than $5 million. Id. at 955. Nevertheless, the defendants filed for
removal, offering calculations based on facts alleged elsewhere in the petition that the amount in
controversy exceeded $5 million. Id. at 954-56. By revising the assumed price fixing overcharge
that served as the basis for the plaintiffs' calculations, the defendant estimated that the amount in
controversy would be $5.04 million. Id. at 955. However, the district court granted the plaintiffs'
motion to remand after finding that the defendants failed to prove with "legal certainty" that the
amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. Id. at 956. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth
Circuit vacated the district court's remand order. Id. at 959.
70 See id. at 956 (quoting Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., Inc. v. McGinnis, 526 F.3d 1170,
1173 (8th Cir. 2008)) (describing removal in non-CAFA context). After the defendant satisfies
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the case will be heard in federal court unless the
plaintiff can prove to a "legal certainty" that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount.
See id. (explaining burden shift once federal jurisdiction established).
71 See id. at 957 (rejecting distinctionbetween CAFA and non-CAFA cases).
72 See id. at 957 (acknowledging CAFA's purpose). The court further noted that the "legal
certainty" burden has primarily been placed on the party seeking to assert federal jurisdiction, not
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court adopted different standards depending on the amount claimed,
defendants in the same circuit would be subject to different standards of
proof, depending on the state court from which the case was removed. 3
2. "Legal Certainty"-Third and Ninth Circuits
The "legal certainty" test requires a significantly higher showing
than the "preponderance of the evidence" test. 74 Under the "legal
certainty" test, the amount claimed by the plaintiff controls so long as it is
claimed in good faith. 75 However, if it is apparent to a "legal certainty"
that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed, or that the plaintiff
was never entitled to that amount, the case may not be heard in federal
court.76 Currently, only the Third and Ninth Circuits require a removing
defendant to prove damages to a "legal certainty" when the plaintiff
disclaims that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.7 7

the party seeking to defeat federal jurisdiction. Id. at 957-58.
71 See Bell, 557 F.3d at 958 (cautioning "unintended consequences" if courts do not adopt
uniform standard). The Eighth Circuit noted that different states have different pleading
requirements. Id. For example, Iowa prohibits plaintiffs from alleging specific damages in
pleadings, whereas Arkansas lacks such a prohibition.
Id. Thus, unless a uniform
"preponderance of the evidence" test is adopted, defendants within the same circuit "would be
subject to varying burdens of proof upon removal based solely on differing state pleading
requirements." Id. See generally Bratvold & Supalla, supra note 63, at 1416 (describing effect
different burdens of proof would have on defendants).
74 See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab, 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938) (announcing
"legal certainty" test). The Red Cab "legal certainty" test seeks to "rigorously" enforce the intent
of Congress to drastically restrict federal jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of
different states. Id. at 288; see also F. Elliote Quinn IV, Note, A Real Class Act: The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 's Amount in Controversy Requirement, Removal, and the
Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 85, 92-95 (2011) (analyzing the
additional burden imposed by "legal certainty standard"). The "legal certainty" standard imposes
a higher burden than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard because it requires the
defendant to prove that the plaintiff cannot possibly legally recover the amount he or she has
alleged. See Quinn, supra, at 92. Critics claim the burden imposed by the "legal certainty" test is
too high because it essentially forces the defendant to "establish[] [the] plaintiff's claim for him"
at the outset of litigation. Id. at 93.
71 See Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 288-89 (articulating legal certainty test).
76 Id. at 289 (describing non-CAFA burden required to defeat defendant's removal to federal
court).
77 See Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting
legal certainty standard); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) (adopting legal
certainty standard). In Morgan, purchasers of the defendant's skin care cream brought a class
action suit for false advertising under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. 471 F.3d at 471. In the complaint, the plaintiffs' expressly
stated that the damages "shall not exceed $5 million in sum or value." Id. After the defendants
removed the case under CAFA, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand asserting that federal
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In adopting the "legal certainty" standard, the Third Circuit relied
on the proposition that plaintiffs are the masters of their own claims and, as
such, may limit their recovery to avoid federal jurisdiction. 78 The Third
Circuit held that the amount in controversy asserted by the plaintiff is
subject to a "broad good faith requirement," which can only be overcome
by a defendant who shows to a "legal certainty" that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.79
Similarly, in Lowdermilk v. United States Bank National Ass'n, 0

jurisdiction was improper because the amount in controversy was less than $5 million. Id.
Affirming the district court's decision to remand the case, the Third Circuit held that the
defendant failed to prove to a "legal certainty" that the amount in controversy exceeded $5
million. Id.at 476. In Lowdermilk, the plaintiff sought relief on behalf of a class of employees
who had been denied full compensation by the defendant for the hours that they worked. 479
F.3d at 996. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that because the defendant had a policy of
rounding hours worked down to the nearest tenth of an hour, each employee was denied
compensation for one to five minutes of the time worked each day. Id. The pleadings expressly
stated that the aggregate total of the claims pled did not exceed five million dollars. Id. The
defendant argued that because the plaintiffs did not seek a specific amount of damages, the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard should apply and, thus, removal should be allowed. Id.
at 998. However, the court determined that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard should
be reserved for scenarios where the court has to look beyond the four comers of the complaint to
determine whether the suit meets jurisdictional requirements. Id. Here, the plaintiff expressly
claimed that the amount in controversy did not reach the threshold for jurisdiction; thus, the court
found the "preponderance of the evidence" standard inapplicable. Id. The dissent noted,
however, that "the 'legal certainty,' or 'good faith,' test ... is applicable where the complaint at
issue specifies an amount in controversy lower than the jurisdictional minimum, not where the
complaint fails to specify what the amount in controversy is." Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 1005
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
78 See Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474. Historically, courts have given deference to the plaintiffs
choice of forum. See Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 294. If the plaintiff wished to limit damages in order
to avoid federal court, the court would allow him to do so because historically, a plaintiff could
only recover the amount pled in the complaint. Id. at 292. But see Quinn, supra note 74, at 102
(suggesting changes in relevant law eliminate need to impose "legal certainty" requirement). The
law in federal court and in a majority of state courts no longer binds plaintiffs by the amount
claimed in the pleadings. Id. at 103 (citing De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th
Cir. 1995)). Rather than limit damage awards to the amount specified in the ad damnum clause
of state pleadings, most states follow the example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c),
which states that "final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see Guglielmino v.
McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 705 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (O'Scannlain, J., specially
concurring) ("In most jurisdictions ... the common law rule no longer prevails and the ad
damnum clause does not set forth an upper limit on recovery."); De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1410
(noting majority of states do not limit damages to state pleading ad damnum amount).
79 See Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474 (addressing requirements of "legal certainty"). In Morgan,
the court held that by failing to disclose the price, sales, or profits of the skin cream, the defendant
did not provide enough infornation to prove to a "legal certainty" that the amount in controversy
exceeded the statutory minimum. Id. at 475-76.
"o 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007).
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the Ninth Circuit held that the "legal certainty" test is proper where a
plaintiff disclaims an amount in controversy in excess of the jurisdictional
minimum.81 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the presumption against
federal jurisdiction necessitated the adoption of the stricter "legal certainty"
test.8 2 Specifically, the court stated that "[b]y adopting 'legal certainty' as
the standard of proof, we guard the presumption against federal jurisdiction
and preserve the plaintiffs prerogative, subject to the good faith

requirement,
to forgo a potentially larger recovery to remain in state
83
court.,

When damages are not expressly limited in the pleadings, both
circuits have held that the defendant must prove that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million by a "preponderance of the evidence."84
Consequently, in the Third and the Ninth Circuits, the defendant's burden
depends on, first, whether the plaintiff asserts an amount in controversy in
the pleadings, and second, on the amount asserted.85 Where the plaintiff

81 See id. at 999 (adopting "legal certainty" test).
82 See id. at 998 (reasoning limited jurisdiction of federal courts requires them to strictly
construe jurisdiction). See generally Quinn, supra note 74, at 95-97 (analyzing presumption
against federal jurisdiction in CAFA context). Federal courts must strictly construe their
jurisdiction in order to avoid infringing upon state sovereignty. Id. at 96; see Bratvold & Supalla,
supra note 63, at 1426 ("[C]ourts should strictly construe [CAFA] yet stop the erosion of federal
jurisdiction over class actions consistent with the provisions in CAFA."). The rules of statutory
construction require that jurisdictional statutes not be given more expansive interpretation than
their text warrants, while also ensuring that they are not given a narrower interpretation than the
text provides. See id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558
(2005)).
83 See Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 999 (holding "legal certainty" standard required to protect
presumption against federal jurisdiction); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text
(explaining historical rationale for giving deference to plaintiff's forum choice). The court also
noted that applying the "legal certainty" standard to this situation maintains symmetry in the civil
justice system because the standard is also applicable when a defendant seeks to remand a case
that has originally been filed in federal court. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 999.
84 See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding "preponderance
of the evidence" applies where plaintiff has not expressly limited damages); Abrego Abrego v.
Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 n.8, 686 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting "preponderance of the
evidence" standard applicable where amount in controversy is not disclaimed).
85 See cases cited supra notes 77, 84 (explaining different burdens required depending on
what damages are alleged); see also Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 2007) (describing three removal standards utilized in Ninth Circuit). First, where the state
court complaint alleges an amount in controversy greater than $5 million, the jurisdictional
threshold is satisfied unless the party seeking to prevent removal can prove to a "legal certainty"
that the plaintiff cannot recover that amount. See Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699. Second, if the
complaint does not specify an amount in controversy, the removing defendant must establish the
jurisdictional threshold by a "preponderance of the evidence." Id. Finally, when the plaintiff
disclaims the amount in controversy, the party seeking removal must prove to a "legal certainty"
that the damages exceed $5 million. Id.

152

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

expressly limits the amount in controversy to less than $5 million, the
"legal certainty" test is used; however, where the pleadings are silent
regarding the amount in controversy, the "preponderance of the evidence"

test is utilized.86
III. ANALYSIS
Congress enacted CAFA in response to perceived abuse of the
traditional class action device.8 7 As a procedural statute, CAFA expands
federal jurisdiction over complex class actions that have implications
nationwide.88
Although preliminary studies indicate that CAFA has
successfully shifted many class actions from state to federal court, CAFA's
docket-shift has not eliminated the behaviors that prompted passage of the

statute .89
Pre-CAFA, critics cited lax certification of class actions by state
court judges as leading to the creation of "magnet jurisdictions" that
ultimately encouraged forum shopping and jurisdictional manipulation. 90
Congress determined that shifting major class actions to federal dockets
would eliminate the problems created by the unbridled discretion of state
court judges. 91 However, by failing to provide a uniform removal standard
for invoking CAFA, Congress provided federal judges with the same
discretion it sought to remove from state court judges.9 2 Additionally,
86 See cases cited supra notes 77, 84 (describing circumstances where "legal certainty" or
"preponderance of the evidence" standard is used).
87 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing reason Congress enacted CAFA).
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5) (2006) (listing requirements of federal jurisdiction

under CAFA); 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2006) (listing requirements for class action removal).
Realizing that the judges of federal courts had better resources to handle complex nationwide
class actions, Congress sought to make removal to federal court easier by relaxing the
jurisdictional requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text (describing resources of federal judiciary).
89 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (outlining findings of FJC class action
study). Preliminary data indicates that class actions were increasingly filed in, and removed to,
federal court after CAFA's enactment. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. However,
although every circuit saw an increase in class action activity, the data varied widely amongst
each circuit court. See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 1-2 (summarizing FJC findings).
90 See supra note 26 (citing lax certification as leading to abuse of class action device).
91 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing abuse resulting from lax class
certification by state court judges).
92 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (admonishing state court judges for discretionary
abuse regarding class certification). In promoting CAFA, Congress criticized state court judges
for being lax about enforcing Rule 23's requirements before certifying class action lawsuits. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text (citing state court judges' lax certification as leading to
magnet jurisdictions). Congress repeatedly stated that nationwide class actions belong in federal
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although the FJC data suggests that CAFA has successfully shifted many
nationwide class actions to federal court, a closer analysis of the data
reveals that the "magnet jurisdiction" problem that existed pre-CAFA has
not been eliminated.9 3
As expected, the number of class actions filed in, or removed to,
federal district courts increased dramatically in the years following
CAFA's enactment. 94 However, the FJC study indicated that, although
every circuit saw an increase in class activity, the results varied widely by
circuit. 95
Specifically, reputed "class-friendly" circuits saw greater
96
increases in original filings and removals than more conservative circuits.
This data suggests that class action plaintiffs are continuing to file actions
97
in the state and federal courts most perceived to be pro-class plaintiff
Interestingly, the number of class action removals trended
downward toward the end of the FJC study. 98 This downward trend
suggests that more class action plaintiffs are choosing to file suit originally

court where judges have the resources to ensure proper certification and oversight of class action
suits. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (arguing federal judges better equipped to handle
class actions). However, by remaining silent as to what burden a removing party must meet to
invoke CAFA jurisdiction, Congress has left discretion to federal judges to parse out the
appropriate removal burden on their own. See supra note 60 (addressing CAFA's silence). Each
circuit's interpretation of CAFA's removal burden has led to a split among the federal circuit
courts. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing each circuit's removal
jurisprudence).
93 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (describing results of FJC study). As
expected, the number of class action removals based on diversity jurisdiction increased
dramatically after CAFA went into effect. See supra notes 50-52 (announcing increase in
removals based on diversity jurisdiction). Taking into consideration that class action removals
more than doubled in the Seventh Circuit, where magnet jurisdictions originally gained notoriety,
the data suggests that CAFA has had a major impact on removing cases from state court dockets.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (stating Seventh Circuit removals based on diversity
jurisdiction more than doubled post-CAFA). However, the data describing original federal filings
based on diversity jurisdiction indicates that plaintiffs are selecting certain federal forums known
to be pro-class action. See supra note 55 (describing which circuits are known to be pro-class
certification).
94 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 3 (reporting 1370 pre-CAFA federal court cases
compared with 2354 post-CAFA federal court cases).
95 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining FJC findings).
96 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits saw
dramatic increases as compared to the level of increase in the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.
See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 22 (reporting dramatic increases in Third, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits).
97 See supra note 55 (noting CAFA encouraged plaintiffs to seek out federal districts most
amenable to class certification).
98 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (describing results of FJC study). Toward
the end of the FJC study, CAFA removals leveled off to approximately the pre-CAFA number of
removals. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing downward trend).
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in federal court so that they can exercise control over forum selection.99 In
fact, the FJC researchers noted that the number of diversity class actions
filed as original proceedings increased more than two hundred percent at
the same time that removals trended downward. 0 0
However, the increase in original class action filings was not
evenly distributed throughout the federal district courts.101 Diversity class
actions originally filed in the Third and Ninth Circuits greatly exceeded the
number of original class action suits filed in other jurisdictions. 10 2 Not
surprisingly, the Third and Ninth Circuits are perceived as being more
amendable to class certification compared to other jurisdictions. 10 3 This
data strongly suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys are 10forum
shopping for pro4
class jurisdictions within the federal district courts.
Exacerbating this forum shopping issue, CAFA's silence
concerning the removal burden provides federal judges with the same
10 5

discretion that Congress sought to remove from state court judges.

Allowing the federal courts to parse out the appropriate removal standard
has resulted in a circuit split between utilizing the "preponderance of the
10 6
evidence" standard and the more strict "legal certainty" standard.
This split creates an incentive for plaintiffs who wish to remain in
state court to forum-shop for the Third and Ninth Circuits. °7 By adopting

99 See FJC STUDY, supra note 47, at 7 (admitting downward trend could be result of fewer
class actions in state courts). The FJC refused to make any definitive conclusions regarding why
there were fewer removals based on diversity jurisdiction toward the end of the study. Id.
However, the researchers suggested that a likely cause of the decrease in removals was that there
were fewer class actions being filed in state court. Id. Instead, plaintiffs were choosing to file in
federal court so that they could choose the federal forum most amenable to their claim. Id.
100 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (reporting original class action diversity filings
nearly tripled in federal district courts post-CAFA).
101 See id. at 9 (stating some circuits saw greater increase in original filings than others).
Class actions were more frequently filed in the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits than the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Id.
102 See id. (describing results of study). The Third Circuit saw a fivefold increase and the
Ninth Circuit saw a four-fold increase in original class action filings based on diversity
jurisdiction. Id.
103 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (characterizing Third and Ninth Circuits' class
certification reputation).
104 See supra note 55 (suggesting increase in original filings a result of plaintiff's altered
forum choices).
105 See supra note 26 (explaining state court judicial discretion led to magnet jurisdictions).
106 See cases cited supra note 64 (outlining circuit split).
107 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (explaining burden requirements for each
circuit). The "legal certainty" standard is significantly higher than the preponderance of the
evidence standard. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating "legal certainty" standard
"rigorously" enforces Congress's intent to safeguard federal jurisdiction). Other circuits only
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the "legal certainty" test as the appropriate removal burden when the
plaintiff disclaims an amount in controversy, the Third and Ninth Circuits
place a significant obstacle in the path of a removing defendant. 08 The
Third and Ninth Circuits cite the presumption against federal jurisdiction
and the proposition that the plaintiff is the master of his own claim as
justifications for imposing the strict "legal certainty" standard on the
removing defendant. 10 9 However, these justifications are misguided in the
class action context because they fail to take into account the due process
rights of defendants and congressional intent. 110
Although it is well established that the plaintiff is the master of his
complaint and may limit damages to avoid federal jurisdiction, the
plaintiff's interest in forum selection does not justify imposing the "legal
certainty" burden on the removing defendant in the class action context.1 11
Due to changes in legal precedent in federal courts and the majority of state
courts, judges and juries are no longer bound by the plaintiffs claimed
damages when awarding a remedy; thus, the historical rationale for giving
the plaintiff's forum choice substantial deference does not justify
imposing
112
the strict "legal certainty" test upon the removing defendant.
Furthermore, requiring a removing defendant to prove that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million to a "legal certainty" forces the

require the removing defendant to prove the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million by a
"preponderance of the evidence." See cases cited supra note 64 (listing circuits utilizing
"preponderance of evidence" standard when plaintiff disclaims amount in controversy).
108 See supra note 74 (describing significantly higher burden of "legal certainty" test). Under
the "legal certainty" standard, the amount in controversy claimed by the plaintiff controls as long
as it is claimed in good faith. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
288-89 (1938) (describing requirements of "legal certainty" test). A removing defendant must
prove to a "legal certainty" that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum for
removal to be allowed. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007).
109 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (outlining Third and Ninth Circuits'
reasoning for adopting "legal certainty" test).
110 See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (explaining plaintiff master of claim
justification fails to consider defendant's due process rights); infra notes 116-21 and
accompanying text (explaining presumption against federal jurisdiction ignores congressional
intent).
111 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing historical rationale for proposition
that plaintiff is master of own claim). Historically, the "legal certainty" standard was necessary to
safeguard the plaintiff's interest in forum selection because the plaintiff's recovery was bound by
the stated amount in controversy. Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 294.
112 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining federal law changes eliminating
justification for "legal certainty" burden). A plaintiffs recovery is no longer limited to what is
pled in the complaint because most states adhere to Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating most jurisdictions
abandoned common law rule).

156

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

defendant to establish "the plaintiffs claim for him."" 3 Unlike the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard where the removing defendant
need only prove that the amount in controversy "more likely than not"
exceeds $5 million, the "legal certainty" standard requires the defendant to
prove that the plaintiff cannot legally recover less than the jurisdictional
minimum. 114 By requiring the removing defendant to produce facts and
information to prove that the plaintiffs claim is actually worth more than
the plaintiff has alleged at the outset of litigation, the defendant's legal
position is undermined as litigation progresses.15
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the presumption against
federal jurisdiction to justify imposing the "legal certainty" burden ignores
congressional intent." 6 Historically, in the diversity jurisdiction context,7
statutes have been narrowly construed to protect state sovereignty."
However, removal statutes should not be so narrowly construed that they
ignore congressional intent." 8 Requiring removing parties to meet the
strict "legal certainty" burden unnecessarily narrows the scope of CAFA
and is directly at odds with Congress's stated purpose in enacting CAFA:
to provide "for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance under diversity jurisdiction."" 9
Additionally, the lack of uniform removal standards encourages

113 See Bell, 557 F.3d at 956-57 (criticizing "legal certainty" standard as too high a burden on

removing defendant).
114 See Quinn, supra note 74, at 92-95 (comparing "preponderance of the evidence" and
"legal certainty" requirements). The "legal certainty" test places a significantly higher burden on
the defendant than the "preponderance of the evidence" test.
See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
115 See Quinn, supra note 74, at 92-95 (admonishing "legal certainty" test as requiring
removing defendant to prove plaintiffs claim for him). When seeking removal, the defendant is
at a "severe informational disadvantage" because he lacks discovery and information beyond the
plaintiff's complaint that would allow him to establish the amount in controversy with legal
certainty. Id. at 93.
116 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (announcing Ninth Circuit's reliance on
presumption against federal jurisdiction).
117 See supra note 82 (explaining historical rationale for guarding presumption against
federal jurisdiction).
118 See Bratvold & Supalla, supra note 63, at 1426 (advising necessity of balancing
congressional intent with textual interpretation of removal statutes). But see Sukenik & Levitt,
supra note 59, at 241 ("Congress was 'emphatic' in insisting that it was 'not impinging in any
way on the independence of the Federal judiciary [or] their discretionary judgments' in passing
CAFA." (quoting 151 CONG. REc. S1225 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter))). Critics cite CAFA's expansion of federal jurisdiction as resulting in precisely the type
of interference Congress guaranteed it would avoid when it passed CAFA. Id.
119 See Quinn, supra note 74, at 88 (cautioning statutory interpretation should not narrow
scope of statute's text).
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plaintiffs' attorneys to manipulate their pleadings within the Third and
Ninth Circuits to avoid federal jurisdiction. 120 As the Eighth Circuit
recognized in Bell, subjecting the removing party to a different standard of
proof depending on the plaintiff's allegation of damages could subject
defendants in the same federal jurisdiction to different standards of proof,
depending on from which state court the case was removed.' 12
For
example, some states prohibit a plaintiff from pleading specific damages,
whereas other states within the same circuit do not restrict pleadings. 2 2 If
the removal burden depends on the damages alleged in the complaint, the
case removed from the state prohibiting specific damages may be subject to
a different burden than the case removed from the state that has no such
prohibition. 23 Plaintiffs wishing to defeat a defendant's right to removal
under CAFA are incentivized to seek out forums that require the removing
defendant to prove the amount in controversy to a "legal certainty.' 24
Consequently, a lack of uniform interpretation among the federal circuits
encourages and rewards the exact behaviors that Congress enacted CAFA
to rectify: forum shopping and manipulation ofjurisdictional requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than remedy abuse through class action regulation in the
state courts, Congress sought to transfer class actions from state court
dockets to federal dockets, where it believed abuse would be less prevalent.
However, it is clear that this docket-shift did not eliminate the problems
and abuses that existed in the pre-CAFA context. The Third and Ninth
Circuits have shown that pro-plaintiff class action jurisdictions-"magnet
jurisdictions"-are not a problem exclusive to state courts. Additionally,

120

See Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699-700 (9th Cir. 2007)

(describing different burdens of proof utilized depending on how plaintiff alleges damages).
121 See Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing "unintended
consequences" of non-uniform removal standards); supra note 73 and accompanying text
(cautioning removal standards based on pleadings subject defendants to different standards within
same circuit).
122 See Bell, 557 F.3d at 958 (describing contrasting state pleading laws in Iowa and
Arkansas despite same federal circuit). In Iowa, the law prohibits any mention of specific
damage in the pleadings. Id. However, Arkansas law does not contain the same prohibition. Id.
Thus, if the Eighth Circuit had adopted a removal standard that depended on what was pled in the
complaint, "defendants within the same circuit would [have been] subject to varying burdens of
proof upon removal based solely on differing state pleading requirements." Id.
123 See id.
124 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining differences in pleading
requirements create different obstacles for removing defendant).
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absent a uniform removal standard, plaintiffs' attorneys are encouraged to
file suits in state courts sitting in the Third and Ninth Circuits to ensure that
their cases are kept out of federal court. In the years following CAFA's
enactment, it is clear that more than a docket-shift is necessary to remedy
forum shopping and manipulation of the civil justice system.
Kalee DiFazio

